Major developments in 2022 and 2023

Authors: Sarah Creemers, Daniël Herbers, Pascal Ramaekers, Janneke Rooyakkers

This chapter focuses on important current developments; events and trends that are affecting the Dutch economy in 2023. The war in Ukraine is the first important situation in this regard. Economically, the whole world is feeling the effects of the war, to a greater or lesser extent. The first section will discuss the development of Dutch trade with Russia and the impact of the sanctions imposed on it. The huge inflation figures call for a careful distinction between the effects of price and volume developments on the rapid growth of goods trade: section 2.3 will give an overview of this. In section 2.4, we discuss the trade relationship between the Netherlands and China. In section 2.5, we consider the Netherlands’ dependence on China, among others, in relation to the green transition the world is facing. Finally, in section 2.6 we look at the development of female entrepreneurship following the Dutch policy on inclusiveness and equality in international trade.

2.1Key findings

One year of war: trade implications

• The EU has imposed sanctions on Russia in response to the war against Ukraine. More than a month after the start of the war and the first sanctions, the value of Dutch imports from Russia began to decrease. The Russian share in Dutch imports fell from 4% in Q1 2022 to 1% in the same quarter of 2023. The value of Dutch goods exports to Russia has decreased every month since March 2022 relative to the same month in 2021. The Russian share in Dutch exports fell from 0.6% in Q1 2022 to 0.3% in the same quarter of 2023.
• Since the import ban as of December 2022, Dutch firms have imported considerably less crude oil from Russia. Instead, imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, the US, Kazakhstan and Iraq have increased.
• In Q1 2023, exports of domestically produced goods to Russia collapsed by 47% compared to the first three months of 2022, while those to Kazakhstan (+136%), Armenia (+121%) and Kyrgyz Republic (+99%) increased sharply. For sanctioned Dutch motor vehicles and office machinery, Turkey and Kazakhstan in particular became more important markets in Q1 2023.

Volume developments in Dutch trade in goods

• According to the National Accounts figures, the price development of Dutch imports in 2022 compared to 2021 was no less than 24.9%; the volume development was around 1.8%. Prices of export goods were 21.0% higher in 2022 than in 2021. The volume of goods exports only increased by 2.3%. In Q1 2023, price development was already more limited with an increase of 4.7% in imports and 5.8% in exports. The import volume in that period was 4.0% higher than one year previously, the export volume 3.9%.
• The price and volume development for our most important trading partners is dominated by mineral fuels. Without this commodity group, the picture looks different: volume developments were mainly positive, both for imports and exports, and price increases were more limited.

Dutch goods trade with China

• Since 1996, total Dutch imports of goods from China have increased 55 times: from €2.3bn to €125.0bn (including quasi-transit trade) in 2022. No less than 89% of total imports from China return abroad as a result of transit flows or export after processing in the Netherlands; 11% of imports remain in the Netherlands (direct domestic expenditure or domestic expenditure after processing in the Netherlands).
• Exports to China have also increased sharply in recent decades, albeit at a significantly lower level than imports. Total exports to China have increased 31 times since 1996, from €0.6bn to almost €19bn in 2022 (including quasi-transit trade). The substantially lower level than for imports is largely due to the fact that quasi-transit trade and re-exports plays a much smaller role in exports. If we exclude all re-exports and quasi-transit trade, the large trade deficit with China disappears.

Import of raw materials and products for our green transition

• The import of transitional goods (i.e., goods needed for the energy transition) from China (€4.6bn) is slightly larger than the import from Germany (€4.5bn), making China the largest supplier of transitional goods. The Netherlands mostly imports solar panels from China, but also lithium-ion batteries and magnets.
• Russia is the largest supplier of transitional raw materials. In 2022, more than €1bn worth of transitional raw materials were imported from Russia, mainly copper and nickel.
• An important difference between China and Russia is that only transitional raw materials are obtained from Russia, while China supplies a wide range of transitional goods (which already contain those critical raw materials, such as rare-earth elements). If you include this indirect import, China is much more important than Russia for our green transition. Moreover, the supply risk of raw materials from Russia (nickel, copper) is limited. The biggest supply risk of all raw materials is with rare earths and these are mainly produced in China.

Women entrepreneurs at internationally operating firms

• In 2021, one third (475 thousand) of all entrepreneurs in the Dutch business economy were in charge of a firm that imported and/or exported services and/or goods. Out of those 475 thousand entrepreneurs, women entrepreneurs accounted for 27%. These shares are comparable to 2019 and 2020.
• The degree of international orientation is closely related to the industry in which the firm operates; differences between male and female entrepreneurs mainly reflect differences between industries.

Outline

This chapter is devoted to the most current developments regarding international trade. Section 2.2 discusses trade developments with Russia after more than a year of war. Ample attention is paid to trade in sanctioned goods. In section 2.3, we explore volume developments in goods trade. The trade relationship between the Netherlands and China is the focus of section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the Dutch dependence for the green transition. Section 2.6 concludes by describing developments in female entrepreneurship.

2.2One year of war: trade implications

One year ago, on 24 February 2022, Russia launched a military invasion of Ukraine. Due to the violence of the war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia, the Dutch trade in goods with those countries has partly come to a standstill. Sanctions are compulsory international measures against a country, organisation or person. The sanctions are supposed to make it difficult for Russia to finance the war, and they specifically target the political, military and economic elite that is responsible for the invasion (European Council, 2023). According to the European Commission, since February 2022, the European Union (EU) has banned more than €43.9 billion worth of goods exported to Russia and €91.2 billion worth of goods imported from Russia. This means that as a result of the sanctions, the EU is currently exporting 49% less to Russia and importing 58% less from Russia than in 2021 (European Commission, 2023a).

The European sanctions against Russia

The EU has imposed individual, economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia in response to the war against Ukraine. The sanctions are in addition to the measures taken against Russia in 2014 because of the annexation of Crimea and the failure to implement the Minsk agreements. In a recent paper, Kohl et al. (2023) studied the consequences of the 2014 EU sanctions for the export and investment relationship between the Netherlands and Russia. The EU has imposed a total of 11 packages of sanctions against Russia since February 2022.

Which goods may not be imported by the EU from Russia?

The sanctions list includes (European Commission, 2023a):

• crude oil and refined petroleum products (sixth sanctions package);
• coal and other solid fossil fuels (fifth sanctions package);
• steel, steel products and iron (fourth sanctions package);
• gold and jewellery (maintenance and alignment package);
• asphalt and synthetic rubber (tenth sanctions package);
• fish, crustaceans and shellfish (e.g., caviar), spirits (e.g., vodka), cement and timber (fifth sanctions package);
• paper, cigarettes, plastics and cosmetic products (eighth sanctions package).

Which goods may not be exported freely by the EU to Russia?

The sanctions list includes (European Commission, 2023a):

• advanced technology (e.g., chips, software, quantum computers) (fifth sanctions package);
• specific types of machinery, machine parts, transport equipment, aviation fuel (fifth sanctions package);
• equipment, technology and services for the energy sector (fourth sanctions package);
• goods and technology for the aviation and aerospace industry (e.g., aircraft, aircraft components) (eighth sanctions package);
• a number of products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes (e.g., drones) (ninth sanctions package);
• goods and technology for the Russian defence and security sector (sixth sanctions package);
• luxury goods (e.g., expensive cars, jewellery) (fourth sanctions package);
• civilian firearms (eighth sanctions package).

In addition, a number of sanctions were in force for service exports, such as accountancy services, IT consulting, legal advice, market research and engineering services (CPB, 2023; European Commission, 2023a). There were also financial sanctions, including an asset freeze against the Russian central bank and sanctions against individuals, such as travel bans and asset freezes targeting members of the Russian elite (Government of the Netherlands, 2023).

Imports from Russia are hit hard

Figure 2.2.1 shows that the value of Dutch goods imports from Russia continued to rise sharply to the end of March 2022. This was particularly the result of the strong increase in energy prices. The import value began to decline around a month after the start of the war, when the first sanctions came into force. The value of goods imports from Russia stood at €2.2 billion in Q1 2023. This is 71% less than in Q1 2022 and 40% less than in Q1 2021. Russia’s share of Dutch imports declined from 4% in Q1 2022 to 1% in Q1 2023.

From March 2022, the export value of Dutch goods to Russia was lower each month than in the same month in 2021, with the sharpest fall in March 2022. In the first three months of 2023, total export value was €768 million. This is 34% less than in the same quarter of the previous year and 44% less than in Q1 2021. As a result, Russia’s share of Dutch exports fell from 0.6% in Q1 2022 to 0.3% in the same quarter of 2023.

Show datatable2.2.1 Goods trade with Russia per month (million euros)Hide datatable2.2.1 Goods trade with Russia per month (million euros)

2.2.1 Goods trade with Russia per month (million euros)

Jaar	Maand	Total imports	Import of sanctioned products	Total exports	Export of sanctioned products
2021*	Jan, 2021*	1058.4	842.3	382.1	241.7
2021*	Feb, 2021*	1134.6	891.8	460.9	275.3
2021*	Mrt, 2021*	1442.5	1201.3	531.4	342.0
2021*	Apr, 2021*	1357.7	1170.1	452.7	284.0
2021*	Mei, 2021*	1544.3	1262.7	448.3	293.7
2021*	Jun, 2021*	1580.0	1301.5	470.9	313.9
2021*	Jul, 2021*	1465.0	1251.2	449.0	295.9
2021*	Aug, 2021*	1772.4	1487.3	465.9	316.8
2021*	Sep, 2021*	1629.6	1210.6	575.3	398.1
2021*	Okt, 2021*	2304.3	1672.4	522.2	365.6
2021*	Nov, 2021*	2486.9	1489.0	645.4	422.1
2021*	Dec, 2021*	2035.2	1398.4	559.8	371.5
2022*	Jan, 2022*	2555.4	1904.4	465.7	301.9
2022*	Feb, 2022*	2157.1	1487.9	504.6	291.0
2022*	Mrt, 2022*	2893.4	1920.0	184.9	75.1
2022*	Apr, 2022*	2383.4	1516.4	199.6	76.8
2022*	Mei, 2022*	1947.8	1333.0	282.3	125.2
2022*	Jun, 2022*	2170.0	1832.3	286.0	119.9
2022*	Jul, 2022*	1955.2	1255.8	346.3	118.3
2022*	Aug, 2022*	1638.4	1099.4	255.4	103.9
2022*	Sep, 2022*	1601.1	810.1	296.9	88.1
2022*	Okt, 2022*	1145.3	478.2	244.6	70.6
2022*	Nov, 2022*	1030.4	546.7	404.5	123.5
2022*	Dec, 2022*	694.9	160.3	280.4	66.3
2023*	Jan, 2023*	935.2	246.2	261.2	71.2
2023*	Feb, 2023*	767.8	128.0	212.3	49.6
2023*	Mrt, 2023*	494.4	62.7	294.5	67.8

Imports of crude oil from Russia nearly dried up at the end of 2022

For years, imports of mineral fuels, including crude oil, petroleum products and natural gas, have made up around 90% of the total import value of goods from Russia. Up to the end of 2022, Russia was the largest supplier of crude oil to the Netherlands. In December 2022, the EU banned the import of Russian crude oil by ship and joined the G7 in setting a price cap of $60 per barrel. In practice, the price cap applies only for non-EU countries, because an even tougher measure came into force in the EU in December 2022 – a total boycott of Russian oil (NOS Nieuws, 2022; Customs, 2022).

Aside from mineral fuels, the Netherlands sources relatively large quantities of metals, such as copper and nickel, from Russia. In 2022, Russia was our largest supplier of copper (34% share) and second-largest supplier of nickel (22% share). Russia was also a major supplier of mineral fertilisers to the Netherlands (7% share in 2022). Dutch imports of nickel, copper and mineral fertilisers from Russia have barely decreased since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (CBS, 2023a). These goods are not subject to the EU sanctions.

The value of Dutch imports of crude oil from Russia continued to increase strongly to the end of March 2022, but then declined virtually continuously. The high import value in June 2022 is attributable to higher fuel prices. In June 2022, a barrel of crude oil cost around €110 on average, which was 59% more than a year earlier. Imports of crude oil from Russia eventually stopped almost completely in December 2022. Although there has been an import ban on Russian crude oil since 5 December, it is possible that Russian oil is still being imported. If this oil is mixed with oil from other countries, it is not possible to work out the country of origin of the oil from its composition (see also CBS, 2023b).

After the import ban on Russian crude oil, Dutch enterprises obtained significantly less crude oil from Russia. In its place, imports of crude oil from Saudi Arabia, the US, Kazakhstan and Iraq in particular increased (Figure 2.2.2). In consequence, Russia’s share plummeted from 31% in December 2021 to 1% in December 2022. Dutch enterprises have therefore been replacing Russian crude oil by purchasing oil from other countries since December 2022. For example, the import value of crude oil from Kazakhstan in December 2022 was four times higher than in the previous year. The import value of crude oil from Nigeria and Iraq tripled over the same period. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West has become more dependent on fossil fuels from countries such as Saudi Arabia, which has huge oil reserves (NOS Nieuws, 2023). Saudi Arabia was therefore responsible for 18% of Dutch crude oil import value in December 2022. The Netherlands needs crude oil and countries such as Norway and the US do not produce enough (Klein, 2022).

Show datatable2.2.2 Share in Dutch import value of crude oil, December (%)Hide datatable2.2.2 Share in Dutch import value of crude oil, December (%)

2.2.2 Share in Dutch import value of crude oil, December (%)

Leverancier	2022*	2021*
Saudi Arabia	18.0	0.0
US	17.5	15.6
Norway	10.8	15.2
Iraq	9.0	4.1
UK	8.9	17.4
Kazakhstan	8.3	2.8
Nigeria	4.5	2.3
Libya	4.0	0.0
Angola	3.0	0.0
Russia	0.5	31.3

Imports of refined petroleum products and coal also sanctioned

As well as crude oil, imports of refined petroleum products, such as kerosene and diesel, from Russia have also been banned since 5 February 2023. In addition to the ban, the EU countries had already agreed a price cap for refined oil: $100 per barrel for diesel and $45 per barrel for fuel oil, for example (European Commission, 2023b). Diesel and kerosene continue to be required, so the Netherlands needs to seek alternative suppliers. This might possibly cause a shift in global trade (Niewold, 2023). Other major importers, such as China and India, have not imposed any sanctions, so Russia can still export large quantities of oil (Trouw, 2023).

Dutch imports of refined petroleum products from Russia were 47 times lower in March 2023 than in the same month of the previous year. This took the Russian share down from 5.8% to 0.2% (Figure 2.2.3). The Netherlands procured a higher value of refined petroleum products from Germany, the UK and Finland, among others.

Imports of Russian coal were also halted by the EU. From mid-August 2022, EU member states were forbidden to import any more Russian coal (Niewold, 2022). Figure 2.2.3 shows that for the Netherlands, imports of coal from Colombia, South Africa, Australia and the US increased from August 2022.

Show datatable2.2.3 Share in Dutch imports of refined petroleum products and coal (%)Hide datatable2.2.3 Share in Dutch imports of refined petroleum products and coal (%)

2.2.3 Share in Dutch imports of refined petroleum products and coal (%)

Leverancier	March 2023*	March 2022*	August 2022*	August 2021*
Refined petroleum products	.	.	.	.
Belgium	26,5	28,3	.	.
Germany	13,1	8,3	.	.
Finland	7,2	3,6	.	.
UK	5,5	4,9	.	.
Russia	0,2	5,8	.	.
Coal	.	.	.	.
Colombia	.	.	35,3	31,2
South Africa	.	.	22,5	2,2
Australia	.	.	22,3	4,6
US	.	.	16,2	32,1
Russia	.	.	0,2	26,6

Eurasian Roundabout: trade via neighbouring countries?

Dutch exports to Russia are very varied. Flowers and plants, medicaments, buses and heavy goods vehicles, agricultural machinery, prepared foodstuffs, and office machines were the six most important product groups in 2019. Together, these groups accounted for 36% of domestic exports to Russia in 2019. Russia was even the Netherlands’ most important customer for office machines in 2019, but in 2022, it dropped to 17th place. In Q1 2023, there were actually no more exports to Russia of office machines, buses or heavy goods vehicles produced in the Netherlands. Exports to Russia of agricultural machinery and medicaments manufactured in the Netherlands increased in Q1 2023: these products are not subject to the sanctions imposed.

Due to the war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia, domestic exports to Russia have largely come to a standstill. In Q1 2023, exports of Dutch products to Russia slumped by 47% compared to the first three months of 2022, while such exports to Kazakhstan soared by 136%. Armenia bought 121% more Dutch domestic products and the Kyrgyz Republic took 99% more. These changes are particularly pronounced for sanctioned goods that accounted for the bulk of domestic exports to Russia before the war. Chupilkin et al. (2023) see substantial changes in regional trade patterns as a consequence of the war against Ukraine and the subsequent introduction of trade sanctions against Russia. This may result in trade via neighbouring economies being used to bypass sanctions.

Exports of sanctioned goods to Russia virtually collapse

Dutch trade in sanctioned products with countries bordering Russia is also booming (Figure 2.2.4). The Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia and Kazakhstan are in the Eurasian Economic Union together with Russia and Belarus. Goods that are exported to these countries can be shipped to Russia with minimal checks (comparable with shipments within the EU, for example). In Figure 2.2.4, we therefore see increasing interest in Kazakhstan since 2022. This may be because traders sometimes use other countries to evade trade bans (Pols & Mouissie, 2022; Chupilkin et al., 2023; Borin et al., 2023). Dutch exporters may also approach these surrounding countries in their search for new and different markets. In addition to Kazakhstan, Turkey also became somewhat more significant as an export destination for the sanctioned products. In Q1 2022, 1.2% of domestic exports were destined for Turkey, rising to 1.4% for the same period in 2023.

Show datatable2.2.4 Share of the Eurasian Economic Union in sanctioned domestic exports (%)Hide datatable2.2.4 Share of the Eurasian Economic Union in sanctioned domestic exports (%)

2.2.4 Share of the Eurasian Economic Union in sanctioned domestic exports (%)

Year	Month	Armenia	Belarus	Kyrgyz Republic	Kazakhstan	Russia
2021*	Jan, 2021*	0.01	0.04	0	0.04	0.85
2021*	Feb, 2021*	0.01	0.04	0	0.06	1.05
2021*	Mar, 2021*	0.02	0.05	0	0.07	1.07
2021*	Apr, 2021*	0	0.06	0.01	0.04	1.01
2021*	May, 2021*	0.01	0.04	0	0.06	0.89
2021*	Jun, 2021*	0.01	0.04	0	0.07	0.93
2021*	Jul, 2021*	0	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.93
2021*	Aug, 2021*	0.01	0.04	0	0.04	0.99
2021*	Sep, 2021*	0.01	0.05	0	0.04	1.26
2021*	Oct, 2021*	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.05	1.12
2021*	Nov, 2021*	0.01	0.03	0	0.07	1.1
2021*	Dec, 2021*	0.01	0.03	0	0.05	0.95
2022*	Jan, 2022*	0.01	0.04	0	0.04	0.93
2022*	Feb, 2022*	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.09	0.96
2022*	Mar, 2022*	0.01	0.01	0	0.06	0.2
2022*	Apr, 2022*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.18
2022*	May, 2022*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.35
2022*	Jun, 2022*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.25
2022*	Jul, 2022*	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.14	0.26
2022*	Aug, 2022*	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.12	0.19
2022*	Sep, 2022*	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.13	0.14
2022*	Oct, 2022*	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.15	0.15
2022*	Nov, 2022*	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.14	0.19
2022*	Dec, 2022*	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.16
2023*	Jan, 2023*	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.13	0.15
2023*	Feb, 2023*	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.1	0.09
2023*	Mar, 2023*	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.26	0.1

Nearly 4 times more HGVs and buses to Turkey in Q1 2023

The sanctions list includes specific types of machinery and means of transport. Of all other motor vehicles that are on the sanctions list, nearly 3% still went to Russia in Q1 2022 (Figure 2.2.5). In the first three months of 2023, Dutch enterprises did not export any more sanctioned heavy goods vehicles or buses manufactured in the Netherlands to Russia or Belarus. However, significantly more sanctioned motor vehicles were exported to Turkey in the same period.

Exports to Russia and Belarus of office machines produced in the Netherlands also stopped completely in Q1 2023. In the first three months of 2022, Russia still received 7.5% of all sanctioned office machines. Turkey and Kazakhstan in particular became important markets for sanctioned Dutch office machines in Q1 2023.

2.3Volume developments in Dutch trade in goods

We have seen huge growth figures in international trade in recent years. These can be explained partly by the improving demand after the COVID-19 pandemic and an increasing supply of goods due to the recovery of production chains, with fewer shortages of raw materials, chips and freight containers in recent months, which have enabled growth in trade volumes. At the same time, the value was also pushed higher by prices: both 2021 and 2022 were years of unprecedented price rises, partly due to the huge demand, the war in Ukraine and – specifically just after the COVID-19 crisis – continuing disruptions in supply chains (CPB, 2022). The import and export values reported in this publication present an increasingly distorted picture of the actual trade flows, in particular in recent years. For example, 21.0 percentage points of the 23.8% growth in goods exports in 2022 compared to 2021 turned out to consist of price rises.noot1

Price developments in international trade are important not only to obtain a comprehensive picture of trade: they also play a key role in domestic inflation. In a small and open economy such as that of the Netherlands, domestic consumer and producer prices are partly determined by inflation elsewhere (IMF, 2009; Naug & Nymoen, 1996). In fact, we import and export not only goods and services, but also the price developments thereof.

In order to give a more realistic picture of the development of international trade, this section will provide an overview of developments in the volume of Dutch goods imports and exports. In doing so, we distinguish between product groups and countries. This is because price trends are not the same for all types of goods and all countries.

Import volume nearly 4% higher in Q1 2023

The sharp price rises conceal whether and to what extent the volume of Dutch goods imports and exports is growing and how the volume of trade flows is developing. According to National Accounts figures (Table 2.3.1), the price development of Dutch imports in 2022 in relation to 2021 was no less than 24.9%. Volume development was around 1.8%, resulting in a 27.2% increase in value. The value of Dutch goods exports in 2022 was an unprecedented 23.8% higher than in 2021, while the volume of those exports rose by just 2.3%.

In 2023, for which only Q1 figures are available, these developments were already much smaller, partly because we are comparing these figures with the already strong price rises in Q1 2022. Price developments for imports in relation to Q1 2022 were only 4.7%. Together with volume development of 4.0%, this produced an increase in the import value of 8.9%. Over the same period, we see a 5.8% price rise and a 3.9% volume increase for exports. As a result, export value grew by 9.9%.

	Value	Price	Volume
	year-on-year growth rate	year-on-year growth rate	year-on-year growth rate
Imports
2022*	27.2	24.9	1.8
2023 Q1*	8.9	4.7	4.0
Exports
2022*	23.8	21.0	2.3
2023 Q1*	9.9	5.8	3.9

Exports of petroleum products subject to inflation

In Figure 2.3.2, we zoom in on total exports of the top 10 domestic goods. To determine these, we combine the most detailed figures on price rises from the National Accounts with the International Trade in Goods statistics. Refined petroleum products were the largest product category in 2022, with a rise in export value of nearly 83% from the previous year. However, the price of these exported petroleum products was on average also around 83% higher than in 2021, so that the volume barely changed. The growth in value was therefore completely determined by inflation. For natural gas exports, the price rise was even more extreme, at an average of over 200%. The value growth therefore turns out to have been masking a contraction in export volume.

In many other product categories, export value growth is a combination of growth in price and volume. For example, exports of machinery and devices (including chip-making equipment) increased in price by nearly 6% in 2022 and by nearly 11% in volume, resulting in value growth approaching 17%.

Show datatable2.3.2 Top 10 domestic exports, development between 2021* and 2022*Hide datatable2.3.2 Top 10 domestic exports, development between 2021* and 2022*

2.3.2 Top 10 domestic exports, development between 2021* and 2022*

Export	Price development	Volume development
Refined petroleum products	82.5	0.2
Machines, equipment (incl. lithography machines)	5.6	11.2
Flowers and plants	0.8	-3.9
Natural gas	234.9	-45.5
Residues of petroleum oils	45.2	37.8
Processed foods	12.6	18.6
Other chemical products	13.2	5.5
Lorries and buses	5.3	14.3
Vegetables and roots	10.5	-1.1
Hydrocarbons	39.3	-24.1

Price of crude oil imports nearly 60% higher in 2022

In terms of value, the biggest import product in 2022 was natural gas (see Figure 2.3.3 for an overview of the top 10 import products). As with natural gas exports, imports saw prices rise more strongly than volume. The import price jumped by an average of over 250%, while the value rose by some 200% from the previous year, so that the import volume decreased. As a result of savings by consumers and enterprises (partly due to the high prices), consumption of other energy sources and a mild winter, we imported less gas in 2022. The price development of crude oil in 2022 compared to 2021 (+58%) was comparable with the value development (+60%): the import volume therefore barely changed, with just a 2% increase. We see a similar picture in refined petroleum products, except that in this case, volume declined slightly.

Computers and laptops, as well as mobile telephones and routers, are product groups for which the import price hardly rose in 2022. An increase in volume was the main factor in the rise in import value. This was also the case for medicaments, pharmaceutical products, medical instruments and passenger cars. For imported chemical products, the increase in price was the dominant factor.

Show datatable2.3.3 Top 10 imports, development between 2021* and 2022*Hide datatable2.3.3 Top 10 imports, development between 2021* and 2022*

2.3.3 Top 10 imports, development between 2021* and 2022*

Import	Price development	Volume development
Natural gas	268.3	-58.9
Crude oil	58.4	1.8
Refined petroleum products	67.9	-2.7
(Mobile) phones, modems, routers	2.2	25
Computers, laptops, tablets	2.1	22.8
Other chemical products	17.9	5.5
Medicines	5.5	14.7
Passenger cars	8.1	11.7
Medical instruments and devices	9.5	18.6
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products	8.6	7.8

Different trading partners, different prices?

Developments in price and volume differ not only between products, but also between countries. The disparities between countries may be due to: (1) the fact that different countries import/export different products from/to the Netherlands. Countries that mainly import products from the Netherlands with substantial price rises experience a greater price development than countries that buy relatively more products with less significant or no price rises; and (2) the fact that enterprises may charge different export or import prices for the same product in different markets. This is referred to as ‘pricing to market’ and it depends on multiple factors, including domestic prices, the exchange rate, the market power of the enterprise and the quality of the goods (Krugman, 1986; Atkeson & Burstein, 2008; Hallak, 2006). The figures used in this section only include part (1) of the differences between countries. New, more detailed figures currently still being developed by CBS will give a more complete picture in the future of the differences between countries, by taking both factor (1) and factor (2) into consideration.

Price rise in mineral fuels dominant in trade with neighbouring countries

Figure 2.3.4 distinguishes the price and volume development of exports in 2022 compared to 2021 by country, looking at the top five export markets.

In 2022, the US was the only country that received more Dutch exports by volume than in the previous year. Exports to Germany, Belgium and France in 2022 featured a huge price increase compared to 2021 and at the same time a drop in volume from the previous year. Mineral fuels play a decisive role in the price and volume developments of total Dutch exports: there are major price rises, in particular in exports to those countries that receive significant shares of mineral fuels and mineral fuel products from the Netherlands. We export hardly any mineral fuels to the US, but we do send large amounts of fuel to France, Belgium and Germany in particular – partly processed (refined petroleum products) and partly as re-exports (crude oil, natural gas). The UK also imported smaller shares of goods in terms of volume in 2022 compared to 2021, but this difference is relatively small. The price rise was also relatively limited compared to the countries to which we export significant amounts of mineral fuels.

Show datatable2.3.4 Top 5 export markets, development of exports between 2021* and 2022* (%)Hide datatable2.3.4 Top 5 export markets, development of exports between 2021* and 2022* (%)

2.3.4 Top 5 export markets, development of exports between 2021* and 2022* (%)

Uitvoer	Price development	Volume development
Germany	57.8	-16.3
Belgium	47.1	-15.4
France	43.3	-12.7
UK	23.6	-3.2
US	21.2	5.4

Dutch imports (Figure 2.3.5) in 2022 present a similar picture to exports: sharp price rises, particularly for imports from the countries where significant amounts of mineral fuels are sourced. The price rise of imported products from the UK and the US was therefore the largest. A price increase can also be seen in the case of Germany and Belgium, although to a lesser extent. Of the top five import partners, imports from China show the smallest price rise. Prices of goods such as computers and laptops, telephones, modems and routers, the bulk of which originate from China, barely rose in 2022 (Figure 2.3.3). Import volumes from China increased substantially, while there was actually a reduction in the quantity of imports from the other countries in the top five.

Show datatable2.3.5 Top 5 countries of origin, development of imports between 2021* and 2022* (%)Hide datatable2.3.5 Top 5 countries of origin, development of imports between 2021* and 2022* (%)

2.3.5 Top 5 countries of origin, development of imports between 2021* and 2022* (%)

Invoer	Price development	Volume development
Germany	26.1	-9.1
Belgium	42.7	-10.4
China	11.1	28.3
US	61.7	-7.8
UK	94.4	-23.3

Volume development predominantly positive in top five origin and destination countries without mineral fuels

If mineral fuels are completely disregarded, it appears that volume developments were predominantly positive, both as regards imports and exports. Only imports from Belgium and Germany were comparable to those of the previous year, with growth figures that showed a slight contraction, as was the case with exports to Belgium. Imports from China, the US and the UK, as well as exports to the US, actually grew strongly between 2021 and 2022 without mineral fuels.

2.4Dutch goods trade with China

In 1978, under the administration of Deng Xiaoping, China launched a programme of reform and greater openness with regard to foreign trade (open door policy). Isolation and autarky were abandoned, and China was slowly integrated into the global economy (De Wijk, 2019). China’s increasing focus on exports to Western countries only really becomes evident in Dutch import figures from the 1990s. From that time on, China has benefited fully from new developments that gave a strong boost to growth in global trade: falling transaction costs; increasing fragmentation of production processes; free movement of goods in the EU; EU expansion; shift of production to China; and increasing use of large container ships (Kuypers et al, 2012; Creemers et al., 2020). After the country joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, it could additionally count on better access to new markets and better trading conditions with other WTO members.

Since 1996, total Dutch goods imports from China have increased by a factor of 55, from €2.3 billion to €125.0 billion in 2022 (Figure 2.4.1). More than half of imports from China consist of quasi-transit trade. This involves goods from China that remain in foreign ownership and, after arriving in the Netherlands, continue their journey, to the European hinterland in particular. Another large share (one-third of total goods imports from China) is destined for re-export (transit goods temporarily in Dutch ownership). Finally, there is a small flow of goods (4%) which, after significant processing into a new product in the Netherlands, ends up abroad. This means that only 11% of original imports from China remain in the Netherlands and that 89% ultimately end up abroad.noot5

Exports to China have also grown sharply over the last decade, although they are at a significantly lower level than imports. Total exports to China have increased by a factor of 31 since 1996, from €0.6 billion to nearly €19 billion in 2022. The much lower level compared to imports is mainly due to the fact that quasi-transit trade and re-exports play a much smaller role here. Once we exclude all re-exports and quasi-transit trade, both on the import and export side, the large trade deficit with China disappears.

Show datatable2.4.1 Dutch goods trade with China (bn euros)Hide datatable2.4.1 Dutch goods trade with China (bn euros)

2.4.1 Dutch goods trade with China (bn euros)

Jaar	Imports excl. quasi-transit trade	Imports incl. quasi-transit trade	Exports excl. quasi-transit trade	Exports incl. quasi-transit trade
1996	1.8	2.3	0.5	0.6
1997	2.4	3.2	0.7	0.8
1998	2.9	4.0	0.6	0.7
1999	3.2	4.6	0.7	0.8
2000	6.0	8.7	1.1	1.1
2001	7.6	10.4	1.2	1.2
2002	7.8	12.0	1.5	1.6
2003	9.3	14.7	1.6	1.7
2004	12.8	19.0	2.2	2.3
2005	16.7	25.8	2.5	2.6
2006	20.0	31.0	3.2	3.3
2007	23.1	37.8	3.5	3.7
2008	22.3	40.4	3.7	4.0
2009	19.6	36.9	4.4	4.7
2010	27.4	49.1	5.2	5.5
2011	27.1	51.0	6.5	6.9
2012	28.1	54.9	7.4	8.0
2013	28.2	53.0	7.4	8.4
2014	31.2	56.8	7.6	8.3
2015	29.1	66.2	8.2	9.5
2016	29.1	63.6	9.3	10.5
2017	32.4	74.3	10.9	12.2
2018	34.8	75.7	11.2	12.6
2019	37.6	79.0	12.1	13.9
2020	38.9	83.0	13.5	15.5
2021*	46.0	97.7	13.2	16.0
2022*	64.2	125.0	14.6	18.7

Goods trade with China has grown much faster than total goods trade

Since 1996, prices of traded goods (see also section 2.3) have risen sharply and with them also the trade values in Figure 2.4.1. At the same time, total global trade has grown strongly – not only trade with China. Because of these trends, in addition to the development of the total goods trade with China, it is also useful to analyse the Chinese share of the total Dutch goods trade. An increasing share here indicates growth in trade with China that is stronger than growth in the total goods trade.

On the imports side, including quasi-transit trade, it can be seen in Figure 2.4.2 that the Chinese share has increased substantially, from 1.5% in 1996 to 12.6% in 2010. Afterwards, growth levelled off and the share even declined slightly in 2022. In 2022, 14.6% of the value of goods arriving in the Netherlands originated from China. Growth was evident to a lesser extent in imports excluding quasi-transit trade, with 9.5% of this flow of goods coming from China in 2022.

China’s share also grew on the export side, but this has never risen above 3%. In 2022, 2% of Dutch goods exports were destined for China.

Show datatable2.4.2 China's share in total Dutch goods trade (%)Hide datatable2.4.2 China's share in total Dutch goods trade (%)

2.4.2 China's share in total Dutch goods trade (%)

Jaar	Imports excl. quasi-transit trade	Imports incl. quasi-transit trade	Exports excl. quasi-transit trade	Exports incl. quasi-transit trade
1996	1.4	1.5	0.4	0.4
1997	1.6	1.9	0.4	0.4
1998	1.8	2.2	0.4	0.4
1999	1.8	2.4	0.4	0.4
2000	2.9	3.7	0.5	0.4
2001	3.7	4.5	0.5	0.5
2002	3.9	5.2	0.7	0.6
2003	4.7	6.3	0.7	0.6
2004	5.8	7.4	0.9	0.8
2005	6.9	8.8	0.9	0.8
2006	7.2	9.3	1.0	0.9
2007	7.9	10.5	1.0	0.9
2008	6.9	10.2	1.0	0.9
2009	7.5	11.6	1.5	1.3
2010	8.6	12.6	1.4	1.3
2011	7.7	11.9	1.6	1.4
2012	7.5	11.9	1.8	1.6
2013	7.6	11.8	1.8	1.7
2014	8.5	12.7	1.8	1.6
2015	8.2	14.3	2.0	1.8
2016	8.3	14.0	2.3	2.0
2017	8.4	14.5	2.4	2.1
2018	8.3	13.8	2.3	2.1
2019	8.7	13.9	2.4	2.2
2020	9.8	16.0	2.9	2.6
2021*	9.3	15.3	2.4	2.2
2022*	9.5	14.6	2.0	2.0

The Netherlands is largest EU importer from China and third-largest exporter

Because the Netherlands transports a lot of goods from China on to the European hinterland, Dutch imports from China are very large compared to most other EU countries. The Netherlands is now the largest importer of goods from Chinanoot6, just ahead of Germany, and it imports two to three times more than Italy (third place) or France (fourth place). In 2000, the Netherlands was the second-largest importer in the EU, at that time still far behind Germany. According to Eurostat, 16.2% of Dutch imports originated from China in 2022 – significantly more than the Chinese share in total EU imports, which was 8.8% (Figure 2.4.3).

With regard to exports, the Netherlands has risen from seventh place as an EU supplier to China in 2000 to third place in 2022, behind Germany and France. In spite of the high position of the Netherlands, China’s share in Dutch exports is lower than the share in total EU-exports. This is due to the scale of German exports to China. Nearly half of total EU exports to China (€230 billion in 2022) are from Germany (€107 billion). Dutch exports to China are at a much lower level (€19 billion). The Netherlands does nevertheless benefit indirectly from Germany’s considerable exports to China as a supplier of car or machine parts to Germany. In 2019, nearly €2 billion of added value created in the Netherlands flowed through Germany to eventually reach China (Aerts et al., 2022).

Show datatable2.4.3 China's share: the Netherlands vs. the EU-27 (%)Hide datatable2.4.3 China's share: the Netherlands vs. the EU-27 (%)

2.4.3 China's share: the Netherlands vs. the EU-27 (%)

Jaar	Imports by the EU-27	Imports by the Netherlands	Exports by the EU-27	Exports by the Netherlands
2000	2.6	3.7	1.0	0.4
2022	8.8	16.2	3.4	2.0

Imports from China mainly high-tech

The products from China with the highest import value in 2022 were computers, laptops and tablets (€22.7 billion) and telephones, modems and routers (€21.0 billion). A long way behind are semiconductor components (mainly solar panels; see also section 2.5), toys and electrical appliances. Without quasi-transit trade and re-exports, the first groups of goods mentioned above remain at the top of the list but the import value is considerably lower. We only have 2021 figures for these: €1.3 billion for telephones, modems and routers, and €1.9 billion for computers, laptops and tablets.

A completely different pattern can be seen in the case of India, another Asian country that is a strong focus of interest, although imports from India are at a much lower level. India is also a source of relatively large quantities of telephones and similar products (Table 2.4.4), but it additionally produces very different goods, such as petroleum products, aluminium or zinc. Partly due to its internationally focused policy, economic growth and huge population, India is a major player in the global trading market (Creemers et al., 2023). India could help the EU reduce its one-sided dependencies on China. In return, increased trade, investment and cooperation on innovation could help India strengthen its own manufacturing industry (Okano-Heijmans & Kranenburg, 2023). After a series of unsuccessful talks, the EU and India are currently resuming negotiations on a free trade agreement (André, 2022).

Exports to China are led by specialised machinery (e.g., Dutch chip-making machines), prepared foodstuffs (mainly baby milk powder) and pharmaceutical products, followed at some distance by medicaments and semiconductor components. If we only consider domestic exports (excluding quasi-transit trade and re-exports), then pharmaceutical products and medicaments drop out of the top five, to be replaced by Dutch pork and Dutch electromedical and radiological devices.

A comparison between China and India also fails when it comes to exports. The share of significant products shipped to India from the Netherlands is extremely small compared to China. Exports to India consist to a great extent of low-value products such as scrap, non-ferrous metals scrap or petroleum residues. For example, metal recyclers export large quantities of metal scrap to India (Creemers et al., 2023).

Most imported from China	€bn	Most imported from India	€bn
1. Computers, laptops, tablets	22.7	1. Petroleum products	1.4
2. Telephones, modems, routers	21.0	2. Telephones, modems, routers	1.1
3. Semiconductor components	12.8	3. Pharmaceutical products	0.6
4. Toys	5.7	4. Aluminium	0.4
5. Electrical appliances	4.9	5. Zinc	0.3

Most exported to China	€bn	Most exported to India	€bn
1. Specialised machinery	2.4	1. Pharmaceutical products	0.2
2. Prepared foodstuffs	2.3	2. Scrap	0.2
3. Pharmaceutical products	2.3	3. Remnants of non-ferrous metals	0.2
4. Medicaments	1.2	4. Medical instruments	0.2
5. Semiconductor components	1.0	5. Petroleum residues	0.2

2.5Import of raw materials and products for our green transition

Under the Green Deal, Europe is committed to reducing its carbon emissions by 55% by 2030 in relation to 1990 levels. By 2050, Europe should be the first climate-neutral continent. The European Commission says that member states should save energy, seek more diverse energy suppliers and become less dependent on fossil fuels as soon as possible (Brands, 2022).

Our green transition entails a greater demand for metals. Copper, lithium and a range of rare earths, among others, are required to manufacture products such as wind turbines, solar panels and batteries. These metals are therefore critical materials for the success of the energy transition, with the Netherlands and the EU currently dependent on supplies from other countries (Engelsman et al., 2023). Geopolitical experts are concerned that we are going to swap our current high dependence on autocratic regimes for the use of fossil fuels for dependence on other autocratic regimes for the use of raw materials and products for a green transition in the near future (Witteman, 2022).

This section looks first at Dutch imports of key end products and product components for the green transition (referred to here as ‘transition goods’). The focus here is on the import value of the various transition goods and their origins. It then examines Dutch imports of key critical raw materials for the green transition (referred to here as ‘transition materials’), again looking at where these come from.

Imports of transition goods

Renewable energy is a crucial part of the green transition as formulated in the European Green Deal. For instance, by 2030, 45% of energy generated in the EU must be sustainable (European Parliament, 2023a). The main renewables are solar and wind energy.noot7 All new large buildings will have to be equipped with solar panels by 2025. From 2029, this will also apply to new-build homes (Brands, 2022). The Netherlands imported €12 billion worth of solar panels in 2022 (Figure 2.5.1). A large part of this (nearly €8 billion) was foreign-owned transit trade (known as quasi-transit trade). Generators and magnets for wind energy were imported for relatively small amounts (in total €0.5 billion).

Another cornerstone of the European Green Deal is sustainable mobility. This includes a ban on new combustion engine cars from 2035 and fast-charging stations for electric cars every 60 kilometres along main EU roads (European Parliament, 2023b). In 2022, the Netherlands imported €3.7 billion worth of hybrid cars and €2.9 billion worth of fully electric cars. In 2021, three-quarters of total electric car imports were destined for the Dutch market. In addition, lithium-ion batteries are important for electric cars and Dutch imports of such batteries totalled €3.8 billion in 2022. In 2021, more than a fifth of the imports of these batteries were destined for the Dutch market.

Finally, biofuels (including liquid biofuels) are also related to green energy (Eurostat, 2022). These are biodegradable fuels produced from vegetable oils, animal fats or recycled fat from restaurants. They can significantly reduce total carbon emissions, provided they are produced sustainably and their production does not compete with food production in relevant countriesnoot8 (IEA, 2011). The Netherlands imported €8.4 billion worth of liquid biofuels in 2022.

Show datatable2.5.1 Dutch imports of transition goods, 2022* (bn euros)Hide datatable2.5.1 Dutch imports of transition goods, 2022* (bn euros)

2.5.1 Dutch imports of transition goods, 2022* (bn euros)

Transitiegoederen	Quasi-transit trade	Other imports
Solar panels	7.8125	4.0977
Biofuels	0.6157	8.3543
Lithium-ion batteries	1.8594	1.9249
Hybrid cars	1.0262	2.6525
Fully electric cars	0.3230	2.6429
Wind turbines	0.0001	0.3341
Magnets	0.0431	0.1789

China is largest supplier of transition goods

Based on the above selection of transition goods, China is the largest supplier for the Netherlands (here, imports excluding quasi-transit trade) (Figure 2.5.2). China has invested heavily in green alternatives to oil and gas in recent years. For example, the country manages more than half of the world’s renewable energy. This is partly because China itself extracts critical materials for the green transition, such as rare earths, and partly because it is involved in processing, logistics and mining outside China (Van den Elshout, 2022). Imports of transition goods (Figure 2.5.2) from China slightly exceed imports of those goods from Germany (€4.6 billion and €4.5 billion respectively). Above all, the Netherlands obtains a lot of solar panels from China, but also spends a significant amount on lithium-ion batteries. From Germany, it imports considerable amounts of biofuels and large numbers of electric cars (hybrid and fully electric). Belgium is also a major supplier (€3.2 billion), mainly of biofuels.

Show datatable2.5.2 Top 10 suppliers of transition goods, excl. quasi-transit trade, 2022* (bn euros)Hide datatable2.5.2 Top 10 suppliers of transition goods, excl. quasi-transit trade, 2022* (bn euros)

2.5.2 Top 10 suppliers of transition goods, excl. quasi-transit trade, 2022* (bn euros)

Herkomstlanden	Biofuels	Wind turbines	Hybrid cars	Lithium-ion batteries	Magnets	Fully electric cars	Solar panels
China	0.2708	0.0163	0.0011	1.0180	0.1130	0.0675	3.0874
Germany	1.5806	0.2484	0.8795	0.2969	0.0261	1.0302	0.4336
Belgium	2.2104	0.0002	0.3193	0.0152	0.0034	0.5356	0.0795
UK	0.4997	0.0005	0.4811	0.0186	0.0035	0.2195	0.0015
Spain	0.7391	0.0001	0.0657	0.0038	0.0006	0.0886	0.0059
Argentina	0.7568	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
South Korea	0.1564	0.0000	0.1468	0.0200	0.0003	0.2870	0.0201
Italy	0.3651	0.0001	0.0368	0.0049	0.0015	0.0234	0.0019
Malaysia	0.3912	0.0000	0.0000	0.0181	0.0000	0.0000	0.0069
US	0.1646	0.0000	0.0007	0.1337	0.0084	0.0079	0.0120

As well as the €3.1 billion worth of solar panel imports from China, the Netherlands imported another €7 billion worth of solar panels from China in 2022 that immediately left the country in the form of quasi-transit trade. Of total solar panel imports (excluding quasi-transit trade), more than three-quarters came from China in 2022. A relatively large share of lithium-ion batteries also come from China: €1.0 billion out of a total of €1.9 billion of regular imports, accounting for a 53% share. Through targeted investments, China is well-placed to produce millions of lithium-ion batteries, for example (Engelsman et al., 2023).

The other seven countries in the top 10 suppliers of transition goods are especially important in the supply of biofuels. Electric cars in particular are imported from the UK and South Korea.

Imports of transition raw materials

We need a variety of raw materials for the production of solar panels, wind turbines and electric cars. The global switch to green energy is therefore boosting demand for a number of crucial raw materials. For these, Europe largely depends on imports from other countries (Albers, 2023). The supply of these raw materials is subject to geopolitical shifts.

A great many critical raw materials are linked to the green transition in Europe. For example, cobalt, lithium, nickel, graphite and manganese are essential for the production of lithium-ion batteries in electric cars (ZERauto, 2019). Compared to a conventional car, an electric vehicle requires at least six times more critical raw materials (IEA, 2021). The European Commission believes that by 2050, demand for lithium will be 57 times higher than it is now (Cooper et al., 2023). Many critical raw materials, such as lithium, are not scarce in absolute terms, but they are relatively scarce because demand is increasing more rapidly than they can be produced (Koenis, 2023; Engelsman et al., 2023).

Magnesium is also listed in Figure 2.5.3 because magnesium batteries could possibly be a safer and cheaper alternative to lithium batteries (Groot, 2019). Furthermore, germanium, silicon, gallium and copper, among others, are needed to produce solar energy, and rare earths, niobium and borates, for example, are important for manufacturing wind turbines (European Commission, 2020). Gallium and germanium were in the news recently because China is going to regulate their export by establishing export licences that could theoretically result in exports to specific countries being refused (Marselis, 2023). In addition, the rare earth neodymium is essential in the production of ‘super magnets’ for wind turbines, but also for electric cars (Groot & Vestergaard, 2022). Platinum group metals, among others, are important in the production of hydrogen electric cars in addition to conventional battery-powered electric cars (European Commission, 2020).

Figure 2.5.3 lists 15 raw materials that the European Commission sees as critical or strategic and that can also be firmly linked to the green transition. Critical raw materials are commodities with a relatively high importance for the European economy and also a relatively high supply risk (European Commission, 2023c). The mining of critical materials does sometimes have major drawbacks, such as human rights violations connected with cobalt mining in Congo (Kara, 2023) or excessive pressure on the environment. For example, 1,700 litres of water are needed to mine 1 kilogram of lithium in Chile, which leaves farmers short of water (Hickel, 2020).

The European Commission does not consider copper and nickel to be critical, but it does see them as strategic, due to their key role in the green transition. In addition, their role in the digital transition, defence, aviation and the aerospace sector is under examination (Boele, 2023). They are also the raw materials that the Netherlands imports the most. Imports of nickel in 2022 totalled €3.4 billion (of which €1.9 billion in quasi-transit trade) and €1.9 billion worth of copper was imported (of which €1.0 billion in quasi-transit trade). A long way behind are imports of manganese, magnesium, niobium, silicon, cobalt and lithium. The other critical and strategic raw materials are hardly ever imported directly as raw materials (more often indirectly, as a building block for an end product).

Show datatable2.5.3 Imports of critical and strategic transition raw materials, 2022* (bn euros)Hide datatable2.5.3 Imports of critical and strategic transition raw materials, 2022* (bn euros)

2.5.3 Imports of critical and strategic transition raw materials, 2022* (bn euros)

Transitiegrondstoffen	Quasi-transit trade	Other imports
Nickel	1.8767	1.5050
Copper	1.0091	0.9361
Manganese	0.3440	0.3781
Magnesium	0.4770	0.0621
Niobium	0.4673	0.0265
Silicon	0.3326	0.1295
Cobalt	0.1572	0.1767
Lithium	0.0127	0.2147
Borate	0.0236	0.0635
Bauxite	0.0044	0.0514
Platinum group metals	0.0079	0.0319
Graphite	0.0102	0.0167
Germanium	0.0115	0.0137
Rare earths	0.0109	0.0109
Gallium	0.0086	0.0000

Russia is largest supplier of critical and strategic transition raw materials

Figure 2.5.4 shows the main countries of origin for the 15 critical and strategic raw materials referred to. Among them, Russia is the largest supplier. In 2022, more than €1 billion worth of transition raw materials were procured from Russia, the bulk of which was copper and nickel. Norway (nickel, manganese, silicon) ranks second and Australia (virtually only nickel) third. Lithium, together with copper, is mainly sourced from Chile. These countries are followed at some distance by China (manganese, magnesium, rare earths), South Africa and Canada (mainly nickel). The top seven are therefore all non-EU countries.

China is thus not among the top suppliers of transition raw materials, but globally, the country does play a major role in almost all green raw material supply chains. For example, it is the world’s largest processor of copper, nickel, cobalt and lithium. For rare earths, China is both the largest raw material producer and the largest raw material processor (IEA, 2021). Moreover, China has properties outside its territory. For example, 15 out of 19 cobalt mines in Congo are fully or partly owned by China, and a large lithium producer in Chile is also partly owned by China (Global News, 2023).

A key difference between China and Russia is that Russia is only a source of transition commodities, while very large amounts of transition goods, such as solar panels, lithium-ion batteries and magnets, which already contain those critical raw materials, such as rare earths, are imported from China. If you include these indirect imports (via end products or components), China is more important for our green transition than Russia. Imports from China (€4.7 billion) are then more than four times higher than imports from Russia (over €1 billion). Furthermore, the supply risk of raw materials from Russia (nickel, copper) is limited, while the biggest supply risk of all raw materials is associated with rare earths and these mainly come from China (European Commission, 2020).

Show datatable2.5.4 Main suppliers of critical and strategic raw materials, excl. quasi-transit trade, 2022* (bn euros)Hide datatable2.5.4 Main suppliers of critical and strategic raw materials, excl. quasi-transit trade, 2022* (bn euros)

2.5.4 Main suppliers of critical and strategic raw materials, excl. quasi-transit trade, 2022* (bn euros)

Herkomstland	Nickel	Copper	Manganese	Lithium	Cobalt	Silicon	Magnesium	Other
Russia	0.3169	0.6494	0.0104	0.0026	0.0478	0.0000	0.0003	0.0000
Norway	0.2223	0.0240	0.0813	0.0000	0.0050	0.0955	0.0000	0.0091
Australia	0.4050	0.0000	0.0057	0.0000	0.0053	0.0006	0.0000	0.0010
Chile	0.0000	0.1504	0.0000	0.1616	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
China	0.0032	0.0001	0.0534	0.0003	0.0127	0.0039	0.0549	0.0277
South Africa	0.0906	0.0152	0.0146	0.0000	0.0200	0.0000	0.0000	0.0024
Canada	0.1188	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0212	0.0000	0.0000	0.0007

There are also other transition materials. These are neither critical nor strategic, but due to their many applications, they are still important for the green transition. In first place is aluminiumnoot9, which, just as copper or iron ore, is important for all parts of the green transition. One example is the required expansion of the electricity grid for solar panels, electric cars and wind turbines, for which the Netherlands depends on copper and aluminium (Van Gestel, 2022). Materials such as tin, silver, zinc (for solar energy), chromium and steel (for wind turbines) also play a role in the green transition.

2.6Women entrepreneurs at internationally operating firms

Encouraging female entrepreneurship is in line with a number of UN Sustainable Development Goals aimed at promoting equality and inclusivity in economic activities (United Nations, 2023). In this context, the role of women in international trade is neglected and insufficiently researched (Dijkhuizen & Majoor, 2019). For some years, CBS has provided insight into the development of trading enterprises led by men and women in ‘Dutch Trade in Facts and Figures’ and through the publication of tables (CBS, 2020). For years, the Dutch government has been pushing for more women in international trade, through specific trade missions, among other initiatives. With programmes such as ‘Groei over grenzen’ (Growth Beyond Borders), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Netherlands Enterprise Agency aim to help enterprises, and specifically enterprises led by women, to achieve their international ambitions and thus become more productive and successful (Central government, 2022; Hoekstra & Schreinemacher, 2022). In this section, we analyse the similarities and differences between men and women who head firms that trade internationally.

In 2021, nearly 475 thousand entrepreneurs led enterprises that imported and/or exported goods and/or services (Figure 2.6.1). That is more than one in three of all entrepreneurs in the Dutch business economy, slightly more than in 2020 but still one percentage point lower than in 2019. Agriculture; forestry and fishing; financial institutions; public administration; education; health care; culture, sports and recreation; ideological and political organisations; wellness and funeral services; households; and extraterritorial organisations and bodies are outside the Dutch business economy. Of the 475 thousand entrepreneurs at the head of an internationally operating firm, 130 thousand were women and 345 thousand were men. This means that in 2021, the share of women (27%) was one percentage point higher for firms that operate internationally than for those that do not. These proportions were exactly the same in 2019 and 2020. If we look at the shares of male and female entrepreneurs that traded internationally in 2021, we also see very little difference. Of all female entrepreneurs, 34% traded internationally in 2021 against 33% of all male entrepreneurs.

At the overall level, international trade therefore seems to have little or no correlation with the sex of the entrepreneur. Later in this section, we consider possible differences in trade value or differences within industries. These overall figures are less consistent with the international literature, which shows that in the Netherlands, as well as other countries, the share of female entrepreneurs trading internationally lags behind the share of male heads of enterprises that also do so (Dijkhuizen & Majoor, 2019). Part of the explanation may lie in the methodological demarcation of female entrepreneurship. The aforementioned report only looks at exports, while in this section, we include both imports and exports. In addition, firms are counted here instead of entrepreneurs as in the study cited. Firms are defined by CBS as ‘led by women’ if at least one female entrepreneur is involved in the business, regardless of the number of male entrepreneurs.

Show datatable2.6.1 Entrepreneurs by sex and international orientation (x 1,000)Hide datatable2.6.1 Entrepreneurs by sex and international orientation (x 1,000)

2.6.1 Entrepreneurs by sex and international orientation (x 1,000)

Handelsstatus	Jaar	Male entrepreneurs	Female entrepreneurs
Trading internationally	2019, Trading internationally	327.6	122.4
Trading internationally	2020, Trading internationally	322.2	119.6
Trading internationally	2021, Trading internationally	344.9	130.1
Not trading internationally	2019, Not trading internationally	634	223.8
Not trading internationally	2020, Not trading internationally	687.2	241.2
Not trading internationally	2021, Not trading internationally	712.5	250.2

Trading entrepreneurs slightly older than non-trading entrepreneurs

In 2021, 46% of all entrepreneurs in the Dutch business economy were aged between 35 and 54 years. Slightly more than a quarter were older and the same proportion were younger. There was a slightly higher concentration of 35 to 54‑year-olds among entrepreneurs who trade internationally (50%). More specifically, slightly more male entrepreneurs were 55 years or older than was the case for women; this was also true of entrepreneurs at the head of enterprises engaged in imports and/or exports. Compared to female entrepreneurs not involved in trade, fewer women at enterprises with international trade were younger than 35 years (23% versus 27%; Figure 2.6.2). However, it does appear that the share of young female entrepreneurs is growing, regardless of the firm’s international orientation. The share of male entrepreneurs aged younger than 35 years also grew between 2019 and 2021. Men and women who lead an enterprise that trades internationally are thus older than entrepreneurs at enterprises without international trade. The relationship between age and the international operations of enterprises barely differs for men and women.

Show datatable2.6.2 Female entrepreneurs by age and representation in international trade Hide datatable2.6.2 Female entrepreneurs by age and representation in international trade

2.6.2 Female entrepreneurs by age and representation in international trade

Handelsstatus	Jaar	15-34 yrs	35-54 yrs	55 yrs and over
Trading internationally	2019, Trading internationally	24.1	69.2	29.1
Trading internationally	2020, Trading internationally	29.3	68.6	32.1
Trading internationally	2021, Trading internationally	32.7	70.5	33.8
Not trading internationally	2019, Not trading internationally	24.9	65.4	29.3
Not trading internationally	2020, Not trading internationally	52.2	117.5	54.1
Not trading internationally	2021, Not trading internationally	72.7	124.2	63.9

Female entrepreneurs relatively strongly represented in trade, business services and accommodation and food services

International orientation is highly dependent on the industry in which a firm operates. For example, in 2021, 50% of all entrepreneurs in the wholesale trade operated internationally, but only 18% of those in construction. Enterprises operating in manufacturing (44%) and information and communication (40%) also have a relatively strong international orientation. If we look at the industries in which the 380 thousand firms led by women are strongly represented (Figure 2.6.3), it is striking that the share of female entrepreneurs in relation to the total business economy (26%) is larger in accommodation and food services (39%), business services (36%) and wholesale trade (32%). In the information and communication; transportation and storage; and construction industries, firms led by men were relatively strongly represented. This is a reflection of the ratio of men to women employed in these industries (CBS, 2023e).

This pattern of more and less strong female representation is also present in the group of enterprises that operated internationally in 2021. If we compare the share of women entrepreneurs between firms that operate internationally and those that do not, we see that the percentage of internationally operating enterprises led by women is only slightly higher among firms belonging to the construction industry (10% compared to 4% in firms in the same industry that do not trade internationally) and transportation and storage (19% compared to 11%). However, the share of firms led by women in these industries involved in trade is still substantially smaller than the share of the totality of firms operating internationally: there is a woman at the head of 26% of all firms that operate internationally. It therefore appears that the industry in which an entrepreneur works is a greater determining factor for international orientation than sex or age. A relatively large number of women work and are entrepreneurs in some industries, while men are relatively strongly represented in other industries.

Show datatable2.6.3 International orientation by sector and sex, 2021Hide datatable2.6.3 International orientation by sector and sex, 2021

2.6.3 International orientation by sector and sex, 2021

Sector	Male entrepreneurs	Female entrepreneurs
Not trading internationally	.	.
Total business economy	712.6	250.2
Wholesale and retail trade	106.2	51.6
Manufacturing	33.1	10.5
Information and communication	54.2	9.6
Accommodation and food services	37.8	25.7
Specialised business services	179.9	106
Transportation and storage	41	4.9
Real estate activities	50	25.9
Construction	186.2	8.2
Trading internationally	.	.
Total business economy	344.9	130.1
Wholesale and retail trade	108.2	48.6
Manufacturing	26.1	7.8
Information and communication	37.7	5.5
Accommodation and food services	17	9.9
Specialised business services	77.2	41.2
Transportation and storage	16.2	3.8
Real estate activities	15.6	6.8
Construction	39.1	4.1

An analysis of the international orientation of enterprises within various industries shows that international trade is not strongly linked to the sex of the person at the head of a firm. In wholesale and retail trade, half of the firms operate internationally, regardless of the sex of the person in charge. A smaller proportion of firms within renting/leasing and other business services, as well as construction, are internationally oriented. It is notable that the small number of female-led firms in construction are more likely to trade across national borders. Within the transportation and storage industry, where the share of internationally operating enterprises is 30%, firms headed by women are also more likely to operate internationally (44%) than those where men are at the helm (28%).

Median trade value lower for firms led by women

Internationally trading enterprises led by female entrepreneurs trade fewer goods and services by value than those led by men.noot10 On average, the trade value between 2019 and 2021 was highest for exports of goods, whether firms were led by men or by women. However, the median export value of firms led by women is one-quarter lower than that of firms managed by men. The difference in trade value is even greater in exports of services. Firms headed by women exported on average around one-third (€13 thousand) less than those run by men in 2021. In imports of services, the difference between firms led by a woman or man is actually relatively small. Firms with a female entrepreneur imported 19% less in 2021 than firms with a male entrepreneur.

For each type of trade, the trade value is therefore considerably higher for internationally trading enterprises headed by a man. In addition, the difference between the median trade value of firms led by women and those led by men was larger in 2021 than in 2019 for each type of trade. Female-led firms therefore export and/or import less on average, and the difference compared to firms led by men increased in absolute and relative terms between 2019 and 2021.

Show datatable2.6.4 Median trade value of internationally trading enterprises, by sex (x 1,000 euros)Hide datatable2.6.4 Median trade value of internationally trading enterprises, by sex (x 1,000 euros)

2.6.4 Median trade value of internationally trading enterprises, by sex (x 1,000 euros)

Geslacht	2021	2020	2019
Goods imports	.	.	.
Male entrepreneurs	45	44	44
Female entrepreneurs	35	34	35
Goods exports	.	.	.
Male entrepreneurs	58	57	53
Female entrepreneurs	44	44	42
Service imports	.	.	.
Male entrepreneurs	21	20	20
Female entrepreneurs	17	16	17
Service exports	.	.	.
Male entrepreneurs	41	39	39
Female entrepreneurs	28	27	28

In conclusion, we can state that the share of women in the total population of entrepreneurs in the Dutch business economy is low at 26%, but that there are few differences between men and women in international entrepreneurship. A similar share of women and men operated internationally in 2019, 2020 and 2021 and the age differences are also limited. What is striking is that enterprises where women are in charge have a lower trade value in both imports and exports of goods and services. In addition, we see a relatively strong representation of enterprises led by women in the industries where more women are employed. The international orientation of enterprises is thus strongly linked to the industry involved, and the differences between men and women are a reflection of this.

2.7References

Open references